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ABSTRACT
The four largest firms in the Nevada slot route industry
control over 70 percent of the industry.

It's structure was

shown to be highly concentrated using the Herfindahl-Herschman
index.
The individual slot route operators appear to conduct
themselves
their

in a non-competitive manner by differentiating

respective

products.

Each

firm

in

the

industry

established their own niche either through product or service
differentiation.
Firms in concentrated industries tend to earn monopoly
profits.
show

Yet, using Tobin's q and Jensen's coefficient, we

that Nevada's

slot

route

firms

did

not

earn

excess

profits, despite the high degree of industrial concentration.
The presence of a high level of industrial concentration,
non-competitive
economic

product

profits

may

differentiation,
be

competition from casinos.

explained

in

and
large

the

lack

of

measure

by

The inclusion of slot route firms

within a more broadly defined Nevada gaming industry would
decrease concentration measures consistent with competitive
market performance conditions found in this study.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Nevada

slot route

industry

is composed of those

establishments that offer non-traditional gaming in non-casino
locations such as bars and supermarkets.

During the past five

years the industry has grown along with the population of the
state of Nevada.

Because of licensing, economies of scale,

and other factors,

the slot route industry's four largest

firms control over 75' percent of the slot route market as of
1991.

This

economic

concentration

will

be

analyzed

and

discussed to determine whether or not the large firms in this
market have significant monopoly power.
As the industry has grown, so has its importance to the
state of Nevada.

Yet, an industrial organizational study of

the Nevada slot route industry has never been done before.
Furthermore,

the

increased.

As

degree
a

of

result,

concentration
a need

exists

in the
to

industry

describe

the

industry's structure, evaluate its conduct, and measure its
performance.
This

study

will

examine

corporations in the industry.
not available.

the

four

publicly

held

Data about the other firms were

However, these firms are very small.

Also,

revenue figures for the industry were not available, but proxy
variables were developed.

Thus, these data limitations did

not prove an insurmountable problem.
This paper will first examine the market for the services
provided by the slot route operators.

This will lead to a

discussion of product differentiation and possible substitute
services.

The

focus

will

then

shift

to

the

licensing

qualifications necessary for entry into this industry.

Next,

the economic concentration of the industry will be measured
and analyzed.

The conduct and strategies of the individual

firms will then be examined.

The focus then will change to a

financial analysis of the returns on assets and equity for
firms in the industry.

Finally,

possible reasons for the

oligopoly structure of the market and the estimated value of
a restricted gaming license will be discussed.
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II. THE LITERATURE REVIEW
Joe S. Bain's Industrial Organization: A Treatise states
that the "performance of the economy or individual parts of
the economy are what is primary in analyzing an industry."1
Bain asserts that it is necessary to not only see how firms
perform, but to also explain how and why they perform in a
particular manner.

This type of analysis can be done by first

observing how a market is structured, and then seeing how this
structure leads to the conduct of firms in the market.

This

method will be used to analyze a key segment of Nevada's
gaming industry, the slot route industry.

First the supply

and derived demand sides of the slot route industry will be
examined,

followed

by

an

evaluation

of

the

worth

of

a

restricted gaming license.
The slot route industry has grown 50 percent since 1986.2
In 1986 the

industry had about

10,000 slot machines.

The

growth over the past five years has expanded the industry to
over 15,000 machines in 1991.

Most of the market share in

this industry is in the top four firms.

As a result, one

would expect that this oligopolistic structure should lead to

1Joe S. Bain, and P. David Qualls, Industrial Organiza
tion; A Treatise (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1989), p. 3.
2Nevada, Gaming Commission, "Quarterly Reports," 1986 to
1991.
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monopoly profits.

Bain in his work showed that "either higher

or lower seller concentration,

or more difficult or easier

entry, would have a significant impact on the incidence of
scale inefficiencies.1,3

The higher the concentration level

in an industry, generally the less competition exists and the
greater

the

Furthermore,

chance

of

of

statewide.

and

economic

profits.

the slot route industry has a high degree of

seller concentration.
percent

collusion

the

The four largest firms have over 70

outstanding

number

of

restricted

slots

This high degree of seller concentration should

also "lead towards cooperative action to establish a joint
profit maximizing

industry price and output."4

Yet,

this

spirit of cooperation does not seem to have evolved in the
slot route industry.

Thus, despite the fact that the slot

route industry has only four main suppliers,

the currently

regulated environment seems to have fostered competition.
In examining the demand side of this industry, the main
users of these slots are bars, restaurants, and convenience
stores.

These establishments must obtain what is called a

restricted gaming license in order to participate in this
industry.5
generally

The

bargaining

small,

but

power

certain

of

these

businesses

locations
do

have

is

more

3Bain and Qualls, Industrial Organization, p. 7.
4Ibid., p. 83.
According to Nevada Revised Statute 463.018,
the
restricted gaming license is for establishments that have 15
or fewer slot machines.

5

bargaining power if they are part of a chain of stores.6
If a slot route operator has three or more locations, the
operator needs both a slot route operators license and a
restricted license.

On the surface this criterion would not

appear to be a large barrier to entry; however, the advantages
that it gives to the incumbent firms may be a deterrent to
potential entrants.
The slot route industry has all the major characteristics
of oligopoly: highly concentrated market share, economies of
scale, and a barrier to entry.

Economic theory would lead one

to believe that the market participants in a non-competitive
and growing industry are likely to have above-normal rates of
return.

Economics literature also leads to the conclusion

that the firms in the industry have an incentive to collude,
and thus further lessen competition.7 The performance for the
firms in the slot route industry is examined by calculating
the Tobin's q for the relevant firms and their return on
equity.
return

In addition, the slot route firms' relative rates of
on

their

stock price

over

the

past

two

years

is

examined and compared that to the return on the stock market
as

a whole.

These

measures

offer

some

evidence

on

the

presence of non-competitive business practices.

6Jackpot Enterprises, "Annual Report," 1991.
7C.E. Ferguson, and S. Charles Maurice. Economic Analysis
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1970), p. 237.
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III. SLOT ROUTE MARKET STRUCTURE
This first section will discuss the derived demand for
products and services of slot route firms.

In addition,

substitute products and the product differentiation between
the

firms

will

be

discussed.

Since

these

firms

provide

machines for players at non-casinos, our discussion focuses on
the

derived demand

for

gaming

machines at

restricted

locations. Only cursory attention will be given to the slot
machine player.

A. Some Aspects of the Market for Slot Route
Firms' Products and Services
Definition of Slot Route Operator
According to Nevada Revised Statue 463.018 a slot route
operator:
Means a person who, under any agreement whereby
consideration is paid or payable for the right to
place slot machines, engages in the business of
placing
and operating slot machines upon the
businesspremises of at least three or
more
locations.
A slot machine is considered a gaming device that is coin
operated.

This definition includes the traditional reel- type

slots as well

as video poker,

keno,

similar games.

The businesses that have a restricted license

1Nevada. Revised Statues. (1991).

blackjack,

and other

7

are mostly

supermarkets,

drug stores,

merchandise

stores,

convenience stores, bars, and restaurants.
At the end of fiscal year 1990-91 there were 77 licensed
slot route operators in the state of Nevada.2 The slot route
operator usually places slot machines in businesses that have
a restricted gaming license.3

Under Nevada Revised Statute

463.161 this is a business that "has 15 or fewer slot machines
and the operation of the slot machines is incidental to the
primary business conducted [at the establishment]."4
Types of Slot Machine Licenses
Gaming is legal in all parts of Nevada according to state
law;

however,

some

locations

are

precluded

by

local

ordinance.5. Gaming licenses are of two types; restricted and
non-restricted.

The restricted licenses are for 15 or fewer

slot machines and non-restricted licenses are for more than 15
slot machines and table games such as craps, blackjack, and
roulette.
Nevada gaming businesses with restricted licenses have
fewer than one-sixth as many slot machines as those with non

Nevada. "1991 Fiscal Year to Date Report," Nevada Gaming
Commission and Gaming Control Board. (1991).
3Some slot route operators own or run casinos.
4Nevada. Revised Statues. (1991).
5The city
gambling.

of

Boulder

City,

Nevada,

has

no

legalized

8

restricted as restricted licenses.6 The competition provided
by casinos with non-restricted licenses is enormous.

In the

338 non-restricted locations there were over 135,000 slots in
operation,

compared to only 15,000 machines

in restricted

locations as of June 30, 1991.7 Along with
the slots, the non-restricted licenses holders (casinos) also
offer tables games such as blackjack, roulette and craps to
entertain

their

clientele.

In

addition

to

the

greater

diversity games, certain gambling halls are commonly thought
to have a higher payout ratio on their

slots than

other

casinos and restricted gaming operators.

For example, the

Boulder Highway and downtown Las Vegas casinos in Clark county
are also believed to offer higher payout ratios.

Casinos also

offer a greater variety of entertainment such as shows, live
bands, slot clubs, bowling, and bingo.

Furthermore, casinos

offer very

and

competitively priced

food

beverages,

make

extensive use of coupon discounting, and provide complimentary
products
players

and
tend

services
to

to

spend

restricted locations.

good

more

at

customers.
the

casinos

Consequently,
than

at

the

And it is generally held that a visit

to a restricted license location is a casual affair for which
consumers have a limited budget.

Thus, slot route operators

face a derived demand for their products and services for
which there is intense competition.
6Nevada. "1991 Fiscal Year to Date Reports," p. 14.
7Ibid.
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Differentiations of Slot Route Operators
Products and Services
To a casual observer, the slot route operator need only
supply machines and coins for the establishments that carry
their machines.

But the slot route operator does much more to

solicit and maintain its clientele. "Machines are routinely
serviced,

repaired,

and maintained by mechanics."8 Indeed

twenty-four hour servicing is an important way in which firms
compete.9

The ability to ensure proper machine operations

keeps customers happy and increases profitability for both
parties.
Although slot route operators compete with an almost
homogeneous product, there are different ways in which the
competing firms try to differentiate their products.

One of

the ways that the slot route operators compete is by product
differentiation through the use of progressive slot machines.
These slot machines use a jackpot that increases incrementally
with each bet.

Slot route operators also may loan start-up

capital to businesses to increase their client base.

Price

competition is also used. For example, slot route operators
may aggressively pursue chain stores,

where the amount of

potential revenue is expected to be high.

8U.S., Securities and Exchange Commission,
Jackpot
Enterprises. Inc.. Form-IOK. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1991),
p. 2.
9Ibid., p. 2.
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Types and Numbers of Slot Operators Licenses
As with all gaining in the state of Nevada, the slot route
operators need to be licensed.
operators

license.

They must possess a slot

Additionally,

each

establishment

that

contains slot machines needs a restricted gaming license.

As

of June 30, 1991, there were 77 slot route operators licensed
in the state of Nevada.10

This figure reflects a decrease

from the 83 route operators in the state for the same time
period

in 1986.

There were

1,849 restricted licenses

in

effect as of June 6, 1991.
Procedures for Obtaining a Slot Operators License
A slot route license is issued to a route operator if the
operator presently has 3 or more locations or a commitment to
shortly have 3 or more locations.11
only

be

issued when

restricted license.

a proprietor

But this license will
has

already

obtained

a

To obtain a restricted license where

there has not been one is usually costly and time consuming.
Background

checks

on

a

prospective

licensee

include

investigations of both business and personal associations, as
well as financial transactions.

Moreover, there is also no

assurance that after thousands of dollars are spent that a

10Nevada. "Quarterly Gaming Report," p. 17
11Nevada. Revised Statues. (1991) .
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license will be issued12.

The risk of not getting a license,

the out-of-pocket costs, and the time necessary to complete
the license procedure keeps many potential entrants out and
functions as a significant barrier to entry.
Restricted licenses are also limited.
Nevada

are

airports,
seeming

"Many visitors to

surprised when they discover slot machines
grocery

stores

omnipresence

authorities

have

the

and

of

laundromats."13

gaming

in

"responsibility

Nevada,
to

Despite
the

assure

in
the

gaming

that

the

location of gaming devices is consistent with state policy to
promote public welfare."14
Restrictions to Licensing
By regulation, the following locations are unsuitable for
gaming:
1.

Premises near churches,
and public playgrounds;

schools,

2.

Premises in a location contrary to local
zoning ordinance unless the premises housed
gaming before the effective date of current
zoning;

3.

Premises difficult to police;

4.

Premises
lacking
surveillance;

adequate

hospitals,

supervision

or

12Currently the application fee for a restricted license
is $500. The per hour charge for background checking is $150.
These fees, along with attorney's fees for an applicant, can
easily surpass several thousand dollars.
13Anthony N. Cabot, (ed.), Nevada Gaming Law. (Las Vegas,
Nevada: Lionel, Sawyer and Collins, 1991), p. 46.
14Ibid., p. 47.
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5.

Premises having a substantial minor clientele
unless the applicant can show sufficient
precautions to separate the area used by
minors from the gaming areas; and

6.

Brothels.15

Even if the establishment's location is suitable, there
are also other criteria. Among these are:
1.

The amount of floor space used for gaming and
that used for the primary business.

2.

The amount of investment in slots compared to
that of the investment in the business.

3.

The amount of time used to manage the slots
compared to the business.

4.

The revenue generated from the slots compared
the primary business.

5.

The portion of financing from the slot route
operator used
for the
creation
of the
business.

6.

Other factors such as name, marketing practice
or public perception showing that the slot
machines are or are not incidental to the
primary business.16

In four circumstances there is a presumption that a slot
machine

operation

is

incidental

to

the

primary

business.

These are:
1.

Taverns;

2.

Convenience stores with
slot machines;

3.

Grocery stores; and

4.

Drug stores.

,5Ibid.
16Ibid., p. 49.

no more

than

seven
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These four areas are where most slot route operators have
their machines.17
Placement Arrangements
Slot

route

operators

have

two

arrangements with their customers:
space,

and

revenue

sharing18.

types

of

placement

subleasing or licensing

Each

type

of

agreement

is

generally

sublease

or

suited to particular locations.
Affiliated

chain

stores

will

license space in their stores to a slot route operator.

The

average rent charged for the space is approximately $125 per
machine per month.19

The rent paid has recently increased

because of the competition to place slot machines at chain
stores.20 The advantage to the sublease or licensing is that
the chain store does not need a license, thereby keeping the
chain stores out of the management of gaming activity and
avoiding the costly licensing process.
The other type of agreement is revenue sharing.

This

agreement is made with an establishment whereby slots are
placed in the business and the revenue generated is split with
17Ibid., p. 50
18U.S., SEC, United Gaming. Form-IOK. p. 4.
19The $125 per month charge per machine was obtained from
Jackpot Enterprises shareholder relations department.
Z0In order to keep a chain store as a long-term customer,
slot route operators will renegotiate a lease before it
expires by offering a higher rent. In the process the lease is
extended but the costs of operating at those locations is
increased.
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the business.

This split is usually a 60-40 percent split,

with 60 percent going to the establishment and the rest to the
slot

route

changes

operator.21

However,

the

percentage

if a slot route operator has made

usually

a loan to the

business.

The more money the slot route operator loaned the

business,

the higher percentage of revenue the slot route

operator will take from the establishment.
Most businesses use slot route operators because of the
efficiencies they produce.

Otherwise, compliance cost of a

firm trying to enter this market would be high.

Furthermore,

a firm would lose revenue during the period it is securing a
license.
would

Also, the time and effort managing gaming operations

likely

impose

increased

inefficiencies

and

deter

specialization from the companies main business endeavors.
B. Firm Size and Structure of Nevada's
Slot Route Industry
The slot route industry is structured as an oligopoly.
The four biggest firms control over 70 percent of the market.
United

Gaming,

Jackpot

Enterprises,

International

Gaming

Technology (IGT) and Electronic Data Technology (EDT) are the
primary players in this market.

The four firms are in control

of 11,699 (75.8 percent) out of 15,434 slot machines operating

21The figures were obtained through the interviewing of
several bar owners in the Las Vegas Valley.
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with a restricted license in operation as of June 30, 1991.22
The major player in the slot route industry is United
Gaming.

The company,

through its subsidiary United Coin,

holds a 35.12 percent [5,420 out of 15,434 total slots in the
industry] of market share.23

United Gaming has been a major

player in the market since the late 1960's.

From 1986 to

1991, United Gaming almost doubled the amount of outstanding
slots from 2,840 to 5,454.24

This increase is compared to a

total of 50 percent growth in the number of restricted slots
statewide.
at

Of these 5,454 slots, 3,990, (73.2 percent), were

revenue-sharing

locations

and

the

rest

at

space-lease

locations.25
Another strong operator IGT, and its subsidiary EDT have
the next largest share of the market, 22.61 percent.[3,490 of
15,434 total slots in the industry).26,27

The breakdown of

the machines into revenue sharing and leasing is not disclosed
22U.S., SEC, Jackpot Enterprises. Form-IOK. p. 5; U.S.,
SEC, International Gaming Technology. Form-IOK. p. 16; U.S.,
SEC, United Gaming. Form-IOK. p. 15; U.S., SEC, Electronic
Data Technologies. Form-IOK. p. 10.
23U.S., Securities and Exchange Commission, United Gaming
Form-IOK. (Washington D.C.; GPO, 1991), p. 16.
24Ibid., p. 9.
25Ibid.
26IGT held close to 45 percent of EDT stock and paid some
of EDT expenses. EDT was a subsidiary of IGT until 1987 when
IGT sold over 50 percent of its stake in the company.
27U.S., Securities and Exchange Commission, International
Gaming Technology. Form-IOK. (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1991),
p. 7.

16

by the company.
Jackpot Enterprises is another major player in the market
with

18.07

percent

[2,787

of

15,434

total

slots

in

the

industry].28 Jackpot obtained 78 percent, of its revenue from
lease and sublease agreements according to its 1991 10K.
The

following

table

summarizes

the

key market

information for the Nevada slot route industry.
TABLE 1
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF SLOT MACHINES FOR
NEVADA SLOT ROUTE FIRMS, 1991
Firm

Number of
Machines

United Gaming

5,420

IGT and EDT

3,490

Jackpot Ent.
Others
Total

2,787
3,737
15,434

Percentage
35.12%
22.61%
18.07%
24.20%
100.00%

Source: U.S., SEC, International Gaming Technol
ogy Form-1OK. p. 16; U.S., SEC, Electronic Data
Technology. Form-IOK. p. 10: U.S., SEC, United
Gaming. Form-IOK. p. 15; U.S., SEC, Jackpot Ent
erprises. Form-IOK. p. 5. Nevada, Gaming Commis
sion, "Quarterly Report, June 30, 1991."

28U.S., SEC, Jackpot Enterprises. Form-IOK. p. 12.

share
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C. Estimation of the Herfindahl-Herschman
Concentration Ratio
The Herfindahl-Herschman Index, referred to as HHI, is a
measure

of

industry

concentration.

It

is

calculated

by

squaring the market shares of each firm in the industry and
adding the squared shares of the firms in the industry.

The

computed HHI can then be compared to the number the United
States

Department

of

Justice

designates

as

to

level

of

concentration of the slot route market.
The

Department

of

Justice

publishes

general

guidelines as to what is considered a highly concentrated
market.
The Department divides the spectrum of market
concentration as measured by the HHI into three
regions that can be broadly characterized as
unconcentrated
(HHI
below
1000),
moderately
concentrated (HHI between 1000 and 1800), and
highly concentrated (HHI above 1800). An empirical
study by the Department of the size dispersion of
firms within markets indicates that the critical
HHI thresholds at 1000 and 1800 correspond roughly
to four-firm concentration ratios of 50 percent and
70 percent.29
Calculation of the HHI with IGT and EDT are taken as a
single entity and is as follows:
(3.1)

HHI = (35.12)A2+(22.61)A2+(18.07)A2= 1,869.

According to the Department of Justice, this industry would be
considered

highly

concentrated

because

the

HHI

exceeds

29U.S., Department of Justice, Antitrust Division Manual
(Washington D.C.: GPO, 1987) sec. II, p. 133.
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1,800.30

A major factor which would influence the ratio is

the definition of the market. If all gaming firms were to be
considered, this ratio would be smaller because the largest
firms hold only a small market share.
Other firms in the slot route market include Anchor Coin
and

Bally

Manufacturing.

Including

these

analysis would reduce the HHI coefficient.

firms

in

the

However Anchor

Coin is a privately held company, its financial statements are
not publicly available.

Also,

Bally Manufacturing did not

disclose any of their slot route operations statistics in
their

financial

Commission.31

reports

to

the

Securities

and

Exchange

But in talks with Jackpot and IGT shareholder

relations departments, they conservatively estimated that the
two firms have at least 1,200 slot machines between them.32
At these numbers the HHI coefficient would be less than 1,800;
nevertheless, the available information is sufficient to reach
the conclusion that economic concentration is present.
The geographic dispersion of the firms is limited.

The

firms are located in the two areas where the bulk of the
population of the state live, Las Vegas and Reno. Jackpot,
United

Gaming,

and

Electronic

Data

Technology

are

headquartered in Las Vegas, and IGT is in Reno. Nevertheless,

30Ibid.
31U.S., SEC, Bally Manufacturing. Form-IOK.
32Lauren Watson, interview by author, Las Vegas, Nevada,
October 1991.

all have offices in other cities where they do business, that
is, United Gaming and Jackpot have offices in Reno, and IGT
has an office in Las Vegas.
Most of the revenue for the industry is generated in the
urban areas of the state.

But the slot route operators do

serve small towns. The rural sites are usually serviced from
Reno and Las Vegas.

For example, Laughlin and Mesquite are

serviced from the Las Vegas and similar range hold for Reno.
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IV. SLOT ROUTE FIRM CONDUCT AND STRATEGIES

Since all the slot route operators have leases on which
their revenue are based, they capture market share by being
aggressive in acquiring leases.

This is done by offering a

more generous revenue split or by increasing the amount of
rent paid to the lease locations.

The firms may also seek new

locations to place their machines.

This includes newly opened

establishments or other businesses that previously did not
have slots.
IGT and

its

subsidiary,

EDT use

technology that was

developed for IGT's casino customers to differentiate their
products.

EDT developed what is called Megabucks for casinos

throughout Nevada.
slot machine
different

Megabucks is a multilocation progressive

system.

locations

This system links
into a progressive

slot machines

system

jackpot increases incrementally with each bet.
slot

route

operators

have

progressive

limited to one particular location.

in

in which a

Although other

machines,

they

are

The IGT Megapoker, like

the Megabucks, links all locations that desire the service.
This multilocational linking allows jackpots to begin at high
levels ($20,000) and to progress at a more rapid rate.

The

jackpot is won by getting a royal flush in sequence: an ace to
a ten.

Since jackpots are higher, customers will prefer to
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play these machines more frequently, other things being equal,
than machines which are not

linked.

Megapoker

banner

generally

have

a

Locations that have
outside

the

location

announcing the presence of the system.
IGT is also the largest manufacturer of slots in Nevada.
The company estimates that their market share for new slots in
Nevada is over 70 percent. IGT asserts that their machines are
among the most attractive and popular.1
machines are also located in casinos,

Since many of the

familiarity with the

product is also important.
United Gaming, through its subsidiary United Coin, also
tries to differentiate its product.

United Gaming, like IGT,

also manufactures its own slot machines.

But United Gaming

has not been as successful as IGT in selling slots to third
parties.2 Among the reasons for this lack of success is the
competition United Gaming has faced from IGT and its lack of
commitment to the market.

United Gaming is the largest slot

route operator in Nevada with a long history in the business.3
Most of United Gaming's slots,
revenue-sharing locations/

3,990 out of 5,454,

are in

United Gaming was successful in

obtaining a large part of this market by being very aggressive

international Gaming Technology, "Annual Report," 1991.
2United Gaming now only manufactures slot machines for
its own use. U.S., SEC, United Gaming Form-IOK. p. 17.
3Ibid.
i b i d . , p. 6.
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in

getting

developed

individual
this

locations.

market

was

One

by

to

of

the ways

lending

establishments to assist in their opening,

they

money

to

thereby giving

United Gaming a new client.

This type of lending has enabled

United

clients

Gaming

elsewhere.

to

attract

As of June 6, 1991,

that

might

have

gone

the amount outstanding of

these loans was close to $9 million.5
The

last large market player is Jackpot Enterprises.

"Generally Jackpot subleases or leases space in stores which
are part of a chain of stores."6

Jackpot believes that the

chain stores are greater volume locations. As a consequence of
the greater foot traffic there is a higher likelihood the
machines will be played.

But there is an inherent risk in

concentrating on leasing space from a chain store.
acquires

the

right

to

place

machines

at

a

When one

chain

store

locations in Nevada, the slot route operator must purchase
enough machines to place in all the stores if enough machines
are not in inventory.

If a chain store has 15 locations, the

need is for 225 machines.

The risk comes into play when the

lease nears its expiration.

If Jackpot is not able to renew

the lease, a large number of machines come off line causing
revenue to drop considerably.

The company then has a large

inventory

However,

of

unused

slots.

Jackpot

has

5U.S., SEC, United Gaming. Form-IOK. p. 17.
6U.S., SEC, Jackpot Enterprises. Form-IOK. p. 4.

been
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successful

in not

allowing this

adverse

impact to occur.

Jackpot has been successful in renegotiating leases before
contract expiration.

The credit worthiness of the firm is

also pivotal in the lease process. Most chain stores want to
be

reasonably

honored.

assured

that

the

rental

agreement

will

be

Since Jackpot has an excellent history in its lease

arrangements,

chain

stores

have

tended

to

favor

this

operator.
Many of the

slot route operators have also tried to

increase revenues by purchasing or building casinos.

IGT owns

and operates hotel casinos in Sparks and Hawthorne, as well as
riverboat

gaming

on

the

Mississippi

in

Iowa.7

Jackpot

Enterprises also owns and operates casinos in Battle Mountain,
Nevada, and Deadwood, South Dakota.

The company's Deadwood

properties are not profitable though Jackpot will soon expand
into riverboat gaming in the vicinity of Memphis, Tennessee.8
United Gaming also owns a casino
according to its 1991 Form-IOK.

in the Reno/Sparks area

All the companies' expansions

into the traditional casino business face stiff competition.
They

will

only

be

marginal

players

in

this

market.

Furthermore, expansion in current slot markets faces growth
opportunities limited by population growth and new business
development.

Not surprisingly,

these firms have chosen to

7U.S., SEC, International Gaming Technology. Form-IOK. p.
3.

^.S. SEC, Jackpot Enterprises. Form 10K. p. 8.
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enter the casino business in other states in order to grow.
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V. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF
SLOT ROUTE FIRMS
Less competitive industries generally tend to have more
profitable

companies.

However, some economic profits can be

spent by managers for other "objectives,
grandeur,
course,

an

easier

life

(and)

including growth,

avoidance

of

risk."1

Of

these non-profit maximizing activities tend to be

corrected in the long-run.

Yet, firms in an non-competitive

industry may not be earning monopoly profits in the short-run
given the above conditions.

These

issue aside,

financial

measures offer useful evidence for evaluating an industry's
performance.
A. Estimates of Return on Equity
One way to judge the performance of a company is by its
return on equity.

The discussion of return on equity will be

restricted to United Gaming and Jackpot Enterprises because
most of IGT's sales were slot machines themselves, and not
slot

route

operations,

and

IGT

also

paid

some

of

EDT's

expenses.2 Therefore EDT's data is not a fair representation

1William G. Shepherd,
The Economics of Industrial
Organization (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
(1979), p. 378.
2U.S. SEC,
p. 5.

International Gaming Technology.

Form-IOK.
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of profitability.
The

profit

rates

for

the

Jackpot

and

United

decreased markedly since 1989 as shown on Table 2.

Gaming

Around the

same time, a large expansion occurred in the number of slot
machines in the industry.
route

operators

This was at a time when the slot

expanded

into

casinos,

which

adversely

affected profits. One problem with return on equity measure is
that they fail to account for debt/equity ratios.

That is,

the return on debt and the firm's risk are not addressed.
Therefore, Tobin's q and Jensen's coefficient are introduced
in the following sections of this study.
TABLE 2
ESTIMATED RETURN ON EQUITY FOR
TWO NEVADA SLOT ROUTE FIRMS
IN PERCENT, 1990-1991
Firm
Jackpot Ent.
United Gaming

1991
7.8%
(-49.6%)

1990
13.3%
9.1%

Source: U.S., SEC, Jackpot Enterprises. Form-IOK.
p. 20; U.S., SEC, United Gaming. Form-IOK. p. 22.
B. Estimates of the Return on Assets's
Using Tobin's q
The following is the formula for the calculation of Tobin's q:
(5.1)

Tobin's q =

market value of assets
estimated replacement costs
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"The numerator of the q includes all the firm's debt and
equity

securities,

denominator
worth."3

includes

and
all

not

just

assets,

its
not

common

stock.

just the

The

firm's net

This ratio generally means that the ratio would be

near 1 for competitive firms and higher than 1 for the less
competitive markets.

As markets become

less competitive,

assets earn a higher return and this pushes the q ratio above
one. "A ratio above unity in the absence of barriers to entry
would attract new entrants, driving q down in the direction of
unity as the excess returns were driven to zero.

On the other

hand,

entry

a monopolist

protected

by

barriers

to

would

experience market capitalization of any monopoly rents. The
market value of the firm would exceed its replacement cost and
q would persist above unity. "A As a result, the q then can be
used as a proxy for monopoly power.
In using this ratio several problems exist. The first
problem is determining the replacement costs of the assets.
Since the majority of the slot companies' assets are gaming
equipment, the assets will be valued at cost.

This is done

because, as gaming has proliferated throughout the country and
new gaming manufacturers have entered the market, prices for
gaming equipment have softened.

A second problem

3R.A. Brealy, and S. Meyers, Principles
Finance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988), p. 60.

is the

of Corporate

4Chen, K.C., G.L. Hite, D.C. Cheng, "Barriers to Entry,
Concentration and Tobins q Ratio," Quarterly Journal of
Business and Economics 28, (Spring 1989), p. 34.
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fluctuating value of the price of the common stock of the
companies.
The q ratios for the two companies were computed for 1991
highs and lows of the common stock, and an average q will be
calculated.

The q for IGT and EDT will not be calculated

because the data is not in usable form. IGT's q will be high
due

to

large

growth

in

sales

and profits

in

its

gaming

equipment sales division and not from its slot route. EDT had
some assets paid for by IGT making the data unusable.
TABLE 3
ESTIMATED TOBIN'S Q FOR TWO NEVADA
SLOT ROUTE FIRMS AT HIGH AND LOW
STOCK PRICES, 1991
Firm

High

Low

Average1

Jackpot Ent.

1.90

1.43

1.66

United Gaming

1.82

0.96

1.39

Note: 1The average is computed as the mean of the
high and low q values.
Source: U.S., SEC, Jackpot Enterprises. Form-IOK.
p. 20; U.S., SEC, United Gaming. Form-IOK. p. 22.
The q ratio for Jackpot is above one for both high and
low

stock

prices.

This

suggests

there

are

some

monopoly

profits that the firm is capitalizing into its stock price.
United Gaming's q has one observation approximately equal to
one. This value suggests that it might be operating around the
replacement costs of its assets and not enjoying monopoly
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profits. Nevertheless, the average values for both firms are
greater than one.

Q ratios in the study by Chen, Hite and

Cheng in show that industries with very high barriers to entry
had an average q of 2.467.5 And that all other group q's were
not significantly different from one.
together,

Taking the two q's

the data suggest that there is not that high a

barrier to entry into the industry.

The q ratios for the slot

route industry do not fall into the high barrier group.
since the q's are

But

on average above one, there is evidence

that some monopoly profits are being capitalized. Yet, a study
done by Smirlock in 1984 found a median q ratio of 1.69.6
Thus, the slot route industry's competitiveness appears to be
about average and economic profits do not seem significant.
C. Nevada Slot Route Operators Common Stock Return
Adjusted for Risk Using Jensen's
Performance Index
Jensen's performance index measures asset performance
adjusted for risk.

Based on the capital asset model,

this

index is identified as follows:7

5Ibid., p. 47.
6Smirlock, M., T. Gilligan, and W. Marshall, "Tobin's q
and Structure-Performance Relation," American Economic Review
(December 1984), p. 1057.
7For a discussion of the measurement of stock and
portfolio performance, including the Jensen performance index,
see Robert C. Radcliffe, 2nd ed., Investments: Concepts
Analysis, and Strategy (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman
and Company, 1987), pp. 813-842.
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(5.2) R(i,t)-RF(t)= A(i)+ B(i)[ RM(t)- RF(t)] , where
R(i,t)= holding period rate of return on the ith
asset at time t;
RF(t)= holding period rate of return on the risk
free asset at time t;
RM(t)= holding period rate of return on the market
portfolio at time t;
B(i)=

the estimated beta for the ith asset; and

A(i)=

Jensens performance index.

If the values for the calculated A(i) are positive, the ith
asset,

in our case the slot industries firm's common stock

outperformed the market adjusted for risk.

If the A(i)

is

negative, the common stock under performed the market adjusted
for risk. The B(i) coefficients, referred to as betas, were
from

Standard

and

Poors.8

The

betas

were

calculated

by

Standard and Poors using the five year stock price information
and the Standard and Poors 500 hundred index.

The market

premium, [(RM(t)-RF(t)], is the difference between the return
on the market and the risk free rate of return.

The holding

period rates of return for common stocks is dividends for the
period plus capital gains as a percent of the beginning stock
price.9

8Standard and Poors Stock Reports Index. March 1992.
9See J.C. Francis and S.H. Archer, 2nd ed., Portfolio
Analysis. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1979), pp. 8-11 for formulas used here.

Negative Jensen coefficients were computed for 1990 for two
slot industry firms, see table 4.

This indicates that returns

TABLE 4
Jensen Coefficients for Nevada
Slot Route Firms Measured in
Percent, 1990-1991
Firm

1990

1991

Jackpot Ent.

0.016

(-0.014)

IGT

0.255

EDT

(-3.262)

United Gaming

(-4.241)

0.567
0.290
(-0.480)

Source: Computed form Quotron, Citibank Data
Services, New York.
adjusted for risk were below that of the market. For one firm,
Jackpot Enterprises,

the

Jensen coefficient is near zero,

indicating that the firm earned only a market rate of return.
Only IGT outperformed the market when adjusted for risk.

But

as suggested previously, this performance largely reflects its
slot machine manufacturing business.

In 1991, the A(i)

for

Jackpot Enterprises was negative, indicating that the company
under performed the market.

Also the Jensen coefficient for

United Gaming remained negative.
Jensen

coefficients

for

On the other hand,

Electronic

Data

Technology

the
and

International Gaming Technology were both positive. The reason
behind Electronic Data's positive Jensen coefficient was that
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International Gaining offered to purchase all of the remaining
shares of EDT that it did not own.

And International Gaming's

Jensen coefficient again was positive because of the large
growth in its gaming machine manufacturing business, and not
its slot route division.

These Jensen performance estimates

indicate that the slot route industry has not outperformed the
market adjusted for risk.

Thus, the risk adjusted evidence

points to a conclusion that monopoly profits have not been
capitalized into the common stock prices of these companies.

t
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VI. DISCUSSION OF NON-COMPETITIVE ASPECTS
OF THE SLOT ROUTE INDUSTRY
Unlike perfect competition and monopoly, oligopoly has no
prevailing

single theory to explain why

structured with few firms.

some markets

are

Yet, two dominant reason offered

for oligopoly are barriers to entry and economies of scale.
These reasons and how they relate to the slot route industry
are now discussed in greater detail.
A. Barriers to Entry
"A barrier to entry may be defined as a cost of producing
(at some or every rate of output) which must be borne by a
firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by
firms

already

in

the

industry."1

An

especially

sizable

barrier to entry in the slot route industry is the gaming
license.

Prior to entry into the gaming industry, individuals

or firms must pass a strict gaming licensing process.

As

previously mentioned, this process costs a minimum of several
thousand

dollars

dollars.

This investigation involves the background checks of

all

applicants,

financial history.

to

upwards

including

of

the

hundreds

of

applicants'

thousands

personal

of

and

Many potential applicants do not wish to

1George Stigler, Organization of Industry
University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 67.

(Chicago:
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subject themselves to this process,
entrants.

limiting the potential

The outcome of the process is never certain, so the

risk of spending

large amounts of money and being deemed

unsuitable for the license is another factor limiting the
potential entrants.

The application process for the gaming

license also takes an extended period of time during which the
applicant can not solicit potential clients.
B. Economies of Scale
"The economies of scale constitute the relationship
between

the

size

of

a

firm

(or plant)

production in the broadest sense."2

and

its

costs

of

Generally firms tend to

get more efficient as they grow because specialization of the
work force, as well as other efficiencies, can develop.
there

is

a

point

at

which the firm

no

longer

gains

But
in

efficiency as it grows and may actually have a decline in
efficiency.

This is the point of diseconomies of scale. This

point leads to the theory that there exists an optimal firm
size in each industry.
In the slot route industry, the company with only a
few locations might have the nightshift employees who have
very little to do.

But they must be there because of the

twenty-four

hour

competitive

pressure to do so. But as the firm's routes

grows,

nature

specialization

2Ibid.

of

of the business

the work

force

and

can

because

occur.

of

The
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distribution of coins and the maintenance of the machines can
become separate increasingly efficient tasks.

The firms that

control most of the market share in the slot route industry
achieve

these

efficiencies.

The

firms

also

can

have

a

specialized administration which can deal in the payment of
gaming taxes, (most counties differ in gaming tax structures),
or the counting of coins taken from the establishments.
Integration of a slot route operator and the supplier
of

slots

has

shown

to

be

of

no

competitive

advantage.

International Gaming Technology produces its own slots for
both itself and the rest of the gaming industry.

IGT has been

extremely successful in the manufacturing of slots, and that
has been an asset to its slot route division.

On the other

hand, United Gaming also manufactures its own slots and has
not had much success.

Jackpot Enterprises purchases its slots

from the producer that it thinks makes the best and most
popular games.

The effects of integration vary by firm, and

any conclusions reached must be extensively qualified. Thus,
conclusions would be of limited use.
C. Valuation of a Restricted Gaming License
One way to determine whether or not monopoly profits
are being made is to compare how much the slot route locations
sell for, and their actual asset value.
1991,

Jackpot

Enterprises

Country Coin, Inc.

purchased

At the end of January
the

assets

of

Corral

The total purchase price for the company

was

$1,656

million.

Of

that

amount,

only

approximately

$321,000 was allocated for the purchase of tangible assets.
The

bulk

goodwill

of the
and

purchase

intangibles.

price,
The

$1,372

million,

goodwill

and

was

for

intangibles

amounted to $4,733 per machine or about $71,000 per location
assuming 15 machines per location.

The substantial amount

that was paid over what the assets were worth shows either
that

holding

the

gaming

license

produces

profits or that a bad decision was made.

some

economics

Nevertheless, the

available evidence suggests that the incumbent firms hold a
favorable market position.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
One might expect the slot route industry to earn economic
profits, but the firms do not. To be sure, the structure of
the slot route industry as measured by the HHI
concentrated.

Furthermore, the

four major

is highly

firms

themselves so as to differentiate their products.

conduct
However,

slot route firms' Tobin's q and Jensen coefficient indicate
they do not outperform other markets.

That is, there was no

significant evidence of economic profits found.
Some

accounting

for the

lack of

through industry consolidation.

economic profits

is

As firms in the slot route

industry are purchased, any monopoly profits that are present
are capitalized into the purchase price.

This helps explain

why Jackpot Enterprises would pay close to $5,000 per slot
machine

above

the

asset value

of

a purchased

slot

route

operator.
High concentration and the lack of evidence of economic
profits may
casinos.

be

expected

Casinos

are

in the
much

face

larger

of
than

competition
the

slot

from
route

operators and, they offer a more diversified gaming product.
Moreover, casinos generate much more revenue than slot route
operators.

The slot route operators have approximately one-

ninth the number of slots as the casinos.

The slot route

industry is a secondary market in the Nevada gaming industry

operating where the large casinos choose not to.

Thus, the

reason that the slot route industry did not create the amount
of economic profits one might expect is largely inherent in
the definition of the slot route industry.
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